Money laundering has become an increasing concern to law makers in recent years, principally because of its association with terrorism. Recent legislative changes mean that auditors may become state law enforcement agencies in the private sector. We 
Introduction
The state deploys numerous technologies to regulate and monitor the behaviour of individuals, groups of people, and professions, some of which are direct and transparent while others are hidden. The hidden technologies include the collection of information by individuals such as auditors and solicitors, institutions such as health authorities and social security agencies, as well as their reporting to the state in accordance with legal obligations. The provider of the information may not know for what purpose it will be used; for example, for statistical analysis, allocation of tax resources, or, when a crime is suspected, to provoke further surveillance by other state actors.
Analytical part
Money laundering may be defined as an attempt to conceal the origin and nature of incomes received illegally and its subsequent integration into the financial system without attracting attention of law enforcement agencies or tax collection authorities [6] . Academic literature is rich regarding the relationship between the state and the profession of the auditor and the reporting obligations. The dichotomy between the auditor-and the state is related to the question whether accounting is a means of detecting, preventing or constraining money laundering, or whether it participates in a crime, enabling and hiding it. The dichotomy is important because if auditors contribute to the commission of a crime, then all sorts of surveillance procedures can be justified, even at the cost of undermining the principle of client's confidentiality. If, instead, auditors deter the crime, this new enhanced surveillance is less justified, and allegations of unreasonable participation become a convenient tool in extending reporting obligations.
The point is that auditors can be fixated on generating better indicators and bureaucratic procedures rather than focusing on exercising substantive judgement. As a result of reporting processes as it is stipulated in the legislation, risk can become the main concern.
The argument is that auditors create complex transactions which can make it difficult to identify the sources and destinations of illegal funds, since although they are mandated to identify and report on such activities, they have difficulty in fulfilling this obligation.
Money laundering requires constant inputs and outputs from financial markets, and criminal organisations have at their disposal financial and accounting specialists cable of finding suitable fronts to circumvent national regulations and technical rules.
The paradox is that accountants can, for example, build corporate structures with interlocking shareholding on behalf of a client, for example in several jurisdictions, to present an entirely legitimate series of transactions for the authorities, but through which subsequent cash flow will come in the form of intra group dividend payments, management charges, or inter-company loans at market interest rates.
The updated legislation requires accountants to scrutinize these supposedly "legitimate structures" for evidence of crime and to report any suspicions.
Nevertheless, "reasonable suspicion" exists in a broad sense, from the feeling that "something is not quite right" to the point that a crime is committed on the basis of objectively evaluated facts.
Therefore, the source materials on which surveillance effectiveness depends are taken from a variety of sources, some of which may be more objective, while others are likely to be vague and less fact-based. Suspicion is not determined by the application of a mathematical process -the observer must extract and process a variety of information to create a consistent database accessible to the control and supervision centers. Data sources -persons, legal or physical, from whom data are received --basically do not pay attention to whom they will be subsequently available and how they will be interpreted.
Law enforcement bodies regularly access databases that are not connected with the police, for example, insurance companies and financial institutions, as well as organizations that are associated with social security, people's income, passport data, securities, etc.
This process of consolidating information flows and separate centres of information storage, along with expanding classes of users and observers, demonstrates a deepening and extending of the financial surveillant assemblage.
Information technologies mean that at the moment there is no central figure; instead, «Modern surveillance technologies are operated by an unstable team of actors with a variety of agendas, each focusing on diverse targets of control» [7] . The most typical ICS violations for AML / CFT purposes are:
• hiding information about unusual transactions related to money laundering committed by «their» clients for a very substantial «fee» reward, which, in essence, is the involvement of the organization in operations related to ML / TF;
• incompliance with the principle «know your client» and the lack of constant monitoring of the client's risk level and his operations; 
Conclusion
Considering the role of auditors and audit organizations in the AML / CFT system, it can be noted that there is an urgent need to significantly expand research on identified issues, the results of which should allow improving existing ones and offer new tools, audit methods that promote AML / CFT and counteract the involvement of audit organizations in ML / FT.
It can be concluded that auditors SRO should develop guidelines for identifying customers, assessing the degree of risk to customers and operations when conducting audits in specific types of business, training and development programs for auditors for AML / CFT purposes, risk management programs for engaging audit organizations and individual auditors in transactions related to ML / FT.
